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ABSTRACT
Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency 
theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains 
under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent 
research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding 
of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy 
while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates 
that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level 
factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing 
legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to 
succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties 
this poses for it.
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Although the idea of contesting it is central to Western counterinsurgency, 
legitimacy remains under-explored in much literature on the topic. This lacuna 
is unfortunate given the importance which both theorists and practitioners 
of counterinsurgency warfare ascribe to the contest for legitimacy between 
insurgents and counterinsurgents. Fortunately, recent scholarship on rebel gov-
ernments – including that represented in this special issue – sheds light on the 
sources, resilience and decay of rebel legitimacy. This paper aims to serve as a 
starting point for a discussion of the links between counterinsurgency and rebel 
legitimacy by exploring how recent work in the latter field sheds new light on 
the theory and practice of counterinsurgency.
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Rebel legitimacy and counterinsurgency
The concept of legitimacy is central to Western writing on counterinsurgency. US 
capstone military doctrine places counterinsurgency in the category of ‘irregular 
warfare’, which it defines as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors 
for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’.1 In it revised 2014 
edition, US counterinsurgency doctrine states that ‘[l]egitimacy, the acceptance 
of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in insurgencies 
and counterinsurgencies’. It also presents the pursuit of legitimacy as a key dif-
ferentiating factor between counterinsurgency and regular warfighting, as in 
counterinsurgency ‘[a]chieving success may depend less on defeating the armed 
element of the insurgency and more on the ability to legitimize host-nation 
institutions to the populace’.2 The same message can be found in NATO and 
other allied doctrine.3
Doctrine-writers have also been clear that counterinsurgency involves not 
just an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of an incumbent state, but that it 
is fundamentally a struggle between competing legitimacies. Insurgents also 
seek to develop their own legitimacy, and the successful counterinsurgent must 
stop them. ‘The insurgency will attack the legitimacy of the host-nation gov-
ernment while attempting to develop its own credibility with the population,’ 
notes FM 3-24. ‘The host-nation government should reduce the credibility of 
the insurgency while strengthening its own legitimacy’. Unless an insurgency is 
prevented from providing ‘effective governance’, it may ‘build local legitimacy’, 
increasing the potency of its threat to the incumbent state.4 In Western writing 
on counterinsurgency, the struggle between the insurgent and counterinsur-
gent to establish their legitimacy in the eyes of the population hence emerges 
as the key site of struggle.
Despite this, there has been surprisingly little critical reflection on the con-
cept of legitimacy – and especially rebel legitimacy – among Western counter-
insurgency theorists. This lacuna can be traced back to the counterinsurgency 
writers of the classical era of the 1960s whose pedigree today’s theorists often 
claim. The concept of legitimacy is almost entirely absent from the writings of 
David Galula. Although his classic text Counterinsurgency Warfare notes that 
incumbent governments hold ‘legitimate power’ at the start of a conflict, he 
does nothing to probe the meaning of this concept or to consider the struggle 
for legitimacy between the government and rebels.5 Neither the word ‘legiti-
macy’ nor any of its cognates appear once in Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare, 
another classic text.6 Instead, the classic writers relied on the concept of ‘support’. 
Theorizing that most of the population in a country undergoing an insurgency 
were essentially apolitical or attentiste (fence-sitters), they saw insurgents and 
counterinsurgents as waging an active struggle to control and mobilize the 
population. The resultant ‘support’ that accrued to the group most able to do 
so was, according to Galula, explicitly not a matter of an ideational judgement 
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about legitimacy but was ‘dictated … by the more primitive concern for safety’. 
He added: ‘Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, 
which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population’s 
stand’.7 The upshot of this was that counterinsurgents needed to develop coer-
cive structures of control which mirrored the insurgents’ organization in order 
to shape popular preferences.8 Legitimacy in the sense of an ideational com-
mitment felt by a population towards a particular system of governance was 
hence less important than the manipulation of behavior through essentially 
coercive state practices.
Today’s Western counterinsurgents are less keen to so openly identify their 
cause with coercive practices, a fact reflected in the key place occupied by 
‘legitimacy’ in contemporary theory. This demands in turn a focus on ideational 
factors and popular preferences as opposed to mere behavior. FM 3-24 and its 
derivatives take a constructivist approach to the matter, espousing the view that 
identity can be manipulated and an ideational commitment to a particular gov-
ernance structure can in effect be created through effective social engineering.9 
But the same writings lack any sophisticated understanding of what legitimacy 
is or the ways in which it emerges, endures and dies. They are unable to draw on 
their classical forebears for insight because the concept was absent from their 
writings, and nor have they engaged with the emerging social science literature 
which could help them understand insurgent and incumbent legitimacy better. 
Instead, the technicians of counterinsurgency have black-boxed a key concept 
upon which their claim to be able to deliver victory rests.
Recent research has juxtaposed the Western model of counterinsurgency 
with an ‘authoritarian model’.10 Rather than focusing on legitimacy, authoritarian 
counterinsurgents are held to rely much more heavily on all the myriad tools of 
coercion at their disposal: murder, torture, incarceration, forced resettlement, 
ethnic cleansing, heavy intelligence penetration and societal control. Some 
writers have even identified the refusal of democracies to ‘escalate the level of 
violence and brutality to that which can secure victory’ as the reason why, in 
comparison to authoritarian states, they are ‘inclined to fail in protracted small 
wars’.11 Yet, as Ucko has pointed out, this distinction between authoritarian and 
Western counterinsurgency may be overblown. Although authoritarian actors 
show a much greater willingness to use coercion in pursuit of their goals, these 
goals do not differ markedly from those sought by Western counterinsurgents. 
Both are ultimately concerned with ‘sustaining domestic support, separating 
insurgents from the population, and spreading state control’. The achievement 
of these goals can never be purely a function of violence and surveillance, which 
occur within a broader political and societal context.12 Like their democratic 
counterparts, authoritarian counterinsurgents seek to manipulate this context 
using a mixture of violent and non-violent means to reach their goals. A reli-
ance on mass slaughter alone may be appropriate for génocidaires, but not for 
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counterinsurgents who ultimately aspire to govern their target population. As 
Arendt writes, ‘nobody can rule over dead men’.13
Just as all counterinsurgents deploy some measure of coercion – and Western 
counterinsurgents have done so much more often in practice than in theory – 
so they all must also concern themselves with legitimacy. As Duyvesteyn dis-
cusses in the introduction to this special issue, understandings of legitimacy can 
broadly be either normative or descriptive. Normative discussions are about the 
moral justifiability of legitimacy claims, while descriptive understandings reflect 
rather on whether the relevant actors consider authority to be legitimate or not. 
This article follows in the descriptive tradition, seeing legitimacy as ‘a descriptive 
concept about normative judgements, but … not itself a normative concept’.14 
Research in this tradition has been replete with insights which open up the 
black box of legitimacy and the process of legitimation. In turn, this allows us to 
explore in more detail the difficulties faced by counterinsurgents who attempt 
to degrade the legitimacy of rebel groups and legitimate their own. This paper 
now turns to consider some of those difficulties.
Primacy of the local
As numerous scholars of irregular warfare have observed, it has a ‘tremendous 
capacity to segment space’.15 The political authority and military control of rival 
sides often spread in a crazy-quilt patchwork over territory. One village might 
be in the hands of the insurgents while its neighbor is controlled by the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, it might be unclear or ambiguous exactly which side 
controls an area, even to the combatants themselves. The cliché of a ‘war without 
fronts’ captures this idea well. Such is the confusion which ensues that coun-
terinsurgents have often felt forced to use complicated statistical tools to try 
to analyze territorial control, such as the famed Hamlet Evaluation System in 
the Vietnam War. An obsession with quantifiable data points led the US military 
to focus heavily on enemy body count and kill/capture ratios, a measure that 
provided almost zero insight into territorial control. In this conflict as in many 
others, an understanding of the true reach of insurgent organization and control 
eluded American commanders.16
Counterinsurgents find it difficult to measure the dynamics of political and 
military control because it rests in part on the elusive concept of legitimacy. 
‘Political legitimacy of a government determines the degree to which the pop-
ulation will voluntarily or passively comply with the decisions and rules issued 
by a governing authority,’ notes FM 3-24. ‘Legitimacy determines the transaction 
costs of political and governmental power.’17 Building on Dahl’s classic analysis 
of how coercive power seeks to ‘clothe itself in the garments of legitimacy’, 
scholars of rebel government have argued that legitimation does indeed reduce 
the transaction costs of governance by promoting voluntary cooperation.18 But 
the relative legitimacy enjoyed by both sides in any given village or province is 
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impossible to establish, a frustration shared by both scholars and counterinsur-
gents. The usual metrics used to measure progress in counterinsurgency – such 
as the number of enemy-initiated attacks or the number of civilians willing to 
volunteer information on the movement of insurgents – give at best partial 
insight into the question. Because legitimacy is rooted in the preferences and 
attitudes of the population, there are few physical or quantifiable data points 
which can be used to measure it. Understood as a determinant of the transaction 
costs of governing, the extent of legitimacy enjoyed by a government or rebel 
group can only be understood by observing the population’s responses to their 
concrete actions. Until then, like Schrödinger’s cat, the status of legitimacy is 
unknown.
The segmentation of physical space which accompanies irregular warfare 
is accompanied by a parallel segmentation of social, political, and economic 
space. This also leads to a segmentation of legitimacy dynamics, as scholars 
focusing on the micro-level of war have stressed.19 This renders problematic the 
understanding of legitimacy offered in Western counterinsurgency doctrine. 
The revised FM 3-24 notes that legitimacy is ‘the acceptance of an authority by 
a society’. ‘The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy 
to establish the rules and the government for that society,’ it continues. ‘A popu-
lation’s values and cultural norms will determine who that society perceives as a 
legitimate authority’.20 But this analysis ignores the fact that the social fragmen-
tation which takes place in many irregular wars means that counterinsurgents 
are typically dealing with hundreds if not thousands of micro-societies with 
their own histories, norms, and expectations bearing on legitimacy. In countries 
with weak central states, this fragmentation of governance likely predates the 
conflict, with a reliance on local, traditional and customary authority prevalent 
and the incumbent state seen as a distant, alien, and illegitimate institution.
The cliché that all politics is local is hence likely to hold true in countries beset 
by irregular warfare, and especially in the weak states which Western counterin-
surgency doctrine has been designed to buttress. This means that the struggle 
for legitimacy has to be conducted at the local level. Counterinsurgency calls 
for incumbent political power to be legitimized – and for that of the insurgency 
to be undermined. In situations of dispersed and fragmented legitimacy, this 
either means that one concept of legitimacy must be imposed from the top 
down or that a patchwork of legitimacies must be built from the ground up. 
Both approaches present problems
From the top–down
Scott’s work on state attempts to impose ‘legibility’ on societies from the top 
down has suggested that grandiose state-driven attempts at social engineering 
usually fail. By demonstrating the resilience of organic local norms in the face 
of coercive attempts to rationalize society by the state, Scott leads us to expect 
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that attempts to replace the heterogeneous forms that legitimacy takes with 
one unified concept focused on the state will be unsuccessful.21
Attempts to claim otherwise have often been based on simplistic and falla-
cious historical analogies. For instance the writers of the FM 3-24 argued that 
‘[s]ometimes large changes, such as the American War of Independence or the 
unification of Germany in 1871, [can] create a change in group identity and 
accepted authority’.22 Yet this drastically overstates the extent to which such 
changes took place as a result of these events. In the case of American inde-
pendence, there was widespread and enduring disagreement over the form 
that ‘accepted authority’ should take, culminating in the Civil War. On the other 
hand, the 1871 unification of Germany was only one event in a centuries-long 
process of emerging German nationalism.23 For other European nation-states – 
the paradigm on which much of the democratic approach to counterinsurgency 
is based – the development of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence by 
the central state also took centuries.24 Weak post-colonial states whose borders 
do not correspondent to any pre-colonial political community face even steeper 
challenges in usurping local legitimacies.
Unsurprisingly, research on the micro-level of legitimacy has indeed shown 
that local legitimacies are bound up with local traditions, customs, norms, social 
structures and economies from which they developed more or less organi-
cally. Although war may disrupt these factors, they still remain the baseline 
against which legitimacy is understood locally. This presents a challenge to 
both Western counterinsurgents attempting to spread liberal norms based 
around the central state and to more coercive counterinsurgents who attempt 
to develop new identities through forced resettlement and re-education. State 
attempts to impose a new norm of legitimacy from the top down can be resisted 
and subverted in myriad ways from the bottom up.25
The characteristics of an insurgency also affects the difficulties which coun-
terinsurgents will face in attempting to degrade rebel legitimacy and supplant 
it with their own from the top down. Western counterinsurgents have frequently 
depicted their enemies as atomized ‘bandits’ who are understood as mere crim-
inals with no legitimacy in the eyes of the broader population. More subtly, 
the modernization discourse which lay behind cold war counterinsurgency 
and which is still influential today sees insurgents as delinquents led astray by 
mismanagement of the modernization process. As Rostow said, Communist 
insurgencies were a ‘disease of the transition to modernization’.26 Both of these 
simplistic views ignore the extent to which rebel groups are often embedded 
in long-standing local political, social and economic systems and subcultures 
of resistance to state authority. Such groups are likely to enjoy substantial 
legitimacy.
To understand how differences between insurgencies and their legitimacy 
complicates counterinsurgency, it is useful to consider Weinstein’s distinction 
between ‘opportunist’ and ‘activist’ rebellions. Opportunist rebellions are those 
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able to easily acquire resources without the consent of the civilian population, 
whereas activist rebellions rely on civilian consent to mobilize. This leads to 
variation in behavior, with activist rebels seeking to strike cooperative bargains 
with civilians and to develop their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Such 
rebellions tend to attract individuals who have ties to the local population and 
share their norms of behavior. Opportunist rebels, on the other hand, attract 
individuals motivated by the prospect of short-term gain.27 While opportunist 
rebels approximate the idea of a ‘bandit’ which has been so prevalent in Western 
counterinsurgency discourse, activist rebels enjoy a deep legitimacy which this 
discourse has never adequately addressed. The support of local populations 
makes activist rebellions extraordinarily resilient. Especially in countries in which 
the central state has never been strong, activist rebels build on pre-existing 
norms and political structures to establish their legitimacy.28 These norms often 
include a strong tradition of resistance to the central state. Rather than being 
criminals or delinquents, activist rebels are an organic outgrowth of the societies 
or micro-societies from which they spring. Activist rebellions are particularly 
likely to enjoy legitimacy which has the characteristics that Duyvesteyn analyzes 
in the introduction to this special issue. Firstly, because they recruit individuals 
locally based on shared norms, they can claim an overlap with pre-existing 
social and political rules in their locality. Secondly, the beliefs by which these 
rules are viewed as legitimate are shared both by rebels and civilians. Thirdly, 
because they go to great lengths to strike and maintain cooperative bargains 
with civilians, these rules are likely to be reflected in practices demonstrating 
compliance.
Democratic counterinsurgency finds such rebellions extremely difficult to 
deal with. FM 3-24 is somewhat schizophrenic on the subject of what ought to 
be done with them. While it stresses that legitimacy must be understood in local 
terms, it also suggests that the only acceptable end-point is ‘security under the 
rule of law’. The deployment of law enforcement assets to tamp down rebel-
lions will lead to them being ‘seen as criminals’, meaning they will ‘lose public 
support’.29 The idea that the solution to rebellions is an essentially apolitical 
‘rule of law’ embodies a norm which is unlikely to be shared by populations 
supporting activist rebels. It is infrequent that counterinsurgents possess the 
understanding of the norms of a distant population which they would require 
to adapt their approach accordingly, especially given the urban bias of most 
incumbent governments. Even if they did possess this knowledge, they could be 
unable to overcome the fact that legitimacy is often based more on the identity 
of those providing governance rather than their actions. Sectional, geographic 
and ethnic splits may prevent local populations from ever accepting the serv-
ants of the central state as legitimate rulers, while causing them to continue to 
support activist rebels who share their identity. Meanwhile, Western militaries 
intervening in support of an incumbent host government face these problems in 
magnified form. Their understanding of the basic features of the social, political 
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and economic terrain of the country in which they are intervening is likely to 
be minimal, and what understanding they do develop is likely to reflect the 
urban bias of the host government. The tendency to view insurgents as apolit-
ical bandits discourages an understanding of the way that a sharing of norms 
between them and local populations sustains insurgent legitimacy. Meanwhile, 
as foreigners who can become the target of nationalist mobilization, their iden-
tity is an even greater barrier to ever being identified as a legitimate partner of 
the host government in establishing its own legitimacy.
Authoritarian counterinsurgents likewise find activist rebellions who enjoy 
strong legitimacy difficult to deal with. As Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 
have argued, mass indiscriminate coercion is particularly likely to be employed 
against insurgencies which enjoy strong legitimacy and share an identity with 
civilians, thus making it harder to separate the insurgents from the population.30 
Perhaps the most potent effect of a broad coercive program is in undermining 
the smooth functioning of rebel governance by denying the rebels the ability to 
provide stability and predictability to civilians under their rule. This can under-
mine rebel legitimacy, especially if they are blamed for provoking the state into 
violent acts.31 But recent research has suggested the limits of mass indiscrimi-
nate coercion as a tool in degrading rebel legitimacy. While ‘bandits’ might have 
a purely instrumental relationship with the population, activist rebels enjoy a 
broader relationship which is more difficult to sever. Despite the disruption 
to rebel governance, high-commitment rebels are likely to seek to evade the 
violence by temporarily relocating to more remote areas. Meanwhile, in a pat-
tern famously observed by Scott, individuals or groups who view the state as 
legitimate are likewise to flee indiscriminate violence by heading to centers of 
state authority, such as towns or major communication routes.32 The result is a 
more polarized countryside in which rebels are able to increase their legitimacy 
among those civilians who remain by providing protection from indiscriminate 
violence and capitalizing on the symbolic pose of resistance.33
In situations of extremely effective or prolonged campaigns of coercion, 
rebels may eventually be forced to adopt a more instrumental and coercive 
stance towards the civilian population in order to extract the resources they 
need to continue functioning. Weinstein has noted that rebels who make this 
transition from being activists to opportunists rarely manage to transition 
back.34 Yet even if rebels are forced to sacrifice some legitimacy in absolute 
terms in the face of mass indiscriminate coercion, this in no way guarantees 
that their legitimacy relative to the counterinsurgent also lessens. While such 
coercion might disrupt and degrade rebel legitimacy, the impact of violence 
and its tendency to depopulate the countryside of pro-government elements 
creates an inauspicious terrain for the government to erect a long-term polit-
ical solution. An example of this dynamic can be seen in the Vietnam War. The 
rural population and the National Liberation Front (NLF) suffered an enormous 
quantity of indiscriminate violence which depopulated the countryside and 
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led the NLF to establish a more coercive relationship with the population. Yet 
even though their own legitimacy was degraded, the government never man-
aged to supplant rebel governance with their own legitimate apparatus, or to 
reduce NLF legitimacy to the point where the organization was forced to cease 
functioning. Each time the violence stopped, the NLF was able to reestablish 
the bare amount of legitimacy and ability to function to allow it to continue to 
harass the government.35
From the ground up
Rather than attempting to degrade and supplant rebel legitimacy from the 
top down, counterinsurgents can attempt to build a patchwork of legitimacy 
from the ground up. This means attempting to coopt local rebel legitimacies 
through a bargain which allows state and local elites to reach a political settle-
ment. Instead of pursuing the quixotic project of spreading one unified norm 
of legitimacy, this allows the regime to capitalize on pre-existing legitimacies 
enjoyed by rebels among the population. The most famous recent example of 
this policy was the ‘Sunni Awakening’ during the US war in Iraq. Frustrated by 
their efforts to directly spread the reach and legitimacy of the Baghdad regime, 
the US instead reached out to Sunni rebel leaders themselves. By providing 
support and resources to one segment of the rebel elite, the US was able to 
capitalize on their local legitimacy to turn the tide against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Often 
considered as a high water mark in recent US counterinsurgency, the policy 
directly contradicted FM 3-24’s insistence that the establishment of state legit-
imacy is the central issue. Instead, it represented a retreat from this point and 
an acknowledgement that legitimacy often depends as much on who governs 
as how they govern. The legitimacy of Sunni rebels was based on their shared 
norms and identity with the local population, something the Shia government 
in Baghdad could not hope to supplant without coopting them.36
Yet this manner of dealing with rebel legitimacy brings problems of its own. 
Once again, research into rebel governance gives insight into how variation in 
the characteristics of insurgencies will affect the suitability of this approach. In 
particular, research on how the identity of rebel movements is instantiated in 
their approach to governance has revealed a wide divergence in their goals. 
Arjona’s typology of rebel governments as either ‘rebelocracy’ or ‘aliocracy’ is a 
source of particular insight. A rebelocracy is a rebel government whose goals 
extend beyond the instrumental, establishing a broader relationship with soci-
ety and delivering reforms to pre-existing local governance. By contrast, an alioc-
racy (‘rule by others’) is content to leave pre-existing local governance structures 
in place while seeking only the freedom to operate and extract resources.37 
By seeking comprehensive reforms which aim to overthrow the status quo, 
rebelocracies are more likely to have goals that are ultimately incompatible 
with those of the central state. As a result, attempts to coopt their legitimacy 
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are problematic because this very legitimacy depends on the extent to which 
they oppose the order and legitimacy represented by the central state and its 
local allies. Furthermore, Kalyvas has found a strong link between the amount 
of territorial control enjoyed by a rebel movement and form of government 
it establishes, with strong control correlated with a more interventionist and 
ideological form of governance.38 As a result, any political settlement reached 
between the state and rebel elites which strengthens the hand of the latter is 
likely to only further entrench the political divisions which spurred the conflict 
to begin with. Because conflicting legitimacies is precisely what is at issue in 
counterinsurgency, such arrangements are hence unlikely to be stable in the 
long term – exactly as the uneasy peace between Baghdad and its Sunni pop-
ulation eventually unraveled.
Conclusion
Research into rebel legitimacy poses a stark challenge to counterinsurgency 
discourse, and especially FM 3-24 and its derivatives. Not only does this discourse 
not problematize the concepts of legitimacy or legitimation, but it seems to 
call for actions which have little hope of achieving its architects’ goal of besting 
rebels in a battle to build and sustain legitimacy. This article raises at least three 
critiques of counterinsurgency discourse.
Firstly, the rational choice approach to civilian agency in warfare which 
underlines FM 3-24 and its derivatives needs revising. In this view – long a fea-
ture of Western counterinsurgency discourse – legitimation is seen as occurring 
through a process in which civilians give the blessing of legitimacy to the actor 
they feel provides them with the best ‘package’ of governance. Governance 
hence becomes something of an open market in which each actor attempts to 
provide the best product to civilians in exchange for the blessing of legitimacy.39 
Yet – to continue the analogy – the market for governance is not at all free or 
open. Instead of civilians making ‘rational’ choices as market participants, legit-
imation is a culturally-bounded process that unfolds according to local norms. 
The barriers to entry for outsiders into this market are extremely high, given 
their lack of information, association with an alien and often predatory outside 
state, and lack of shared norms or identity with the population they are trying to 
win over. By contrast, many rebels possess just the qualities needed to establish 
a monopoly.
Secondly, theorists must recognize that all counterinsurgency is local. While 
doctrine-writers and theorists naturally seek to provide generalizations appli-
cable to as wide a variety of local and micro-situations as possible, they still 
have to confront the problems caused by the fragmentation of space, govern-
ance, and legitimacy which invariably accompanies irregular warfare. In such 
situations, the two basic options available to counterinsurgents attempting to 
replace rebel legitimacy with their own – either the cooption of local legitimacy 
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from the ground up or its displacement from the bottom down – are likely 
to fail. Attempts to coopt local elites and their own legitimacy have proven 
unstable, while attempts to supplant them entirely from the top–down have 
failed.40 In countries with weak states which have never been seen as legitimate 
actors in many localities, the very idea of the state being recognized as such is a 
Eurocentric import. Research into rebel governance and legitimacy hence give 
us reasons to doubt whether FM 3-24’s approach will work in any but the most 
permissive of circumstances.
Finally, both Western and authoritarian counterinsurgents need to rethink 
the relationship between means and ends in establishing legitimacy. Western 
counterinsurgency theorists focus on avoiding further delegitimizing the 
incumbent state through avoiding actions that harm the population, while 
attempting to improve its product on the market for governance. Yet given 
the culturally-bounded and locally oriented nature of legitimacy dynamics, the 
simple protection of the population is not enough to legitimize a state or to 
undermine activist rebel groups. The central insight of population-centric coun-
terinsurgency is hence a sine qua non, but by no means a guarantor of success, 
which depends instead much more on factors beyond the counterinsurgents’ 
control. Authoritarian counterinsurgents face the same problem when they rely 
on violence to put pressure on insurgents and change the nature of their rela-
tionship with the civilian population. While they help undermine the legitimacy 
of the rebels, they do little to improve that of the state.
Taken together, these critiques cast serious doubt on the Western counter-
insurgency approach exemplified in FM 3-24 and its derivatives. For as long as 
legitimacy and legitimation remain under-theorized, over-generalized, and mis-
understood, counterinsurgents will remain ineffectual at achieving their goals. 
It is hence urgent that practitioners and proponents of the ‘graduate school of 
war’ study these phenomena to give them a more realistic appreciation of the 
relationship of means to ends in the struggle for legitimacy. In turn, scholars of 
rebel governance and legitimacy have a vital role to play in illustrating the limits 
of counterinsurgency and the flaws in current doctrine and theory.
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